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ABSTRACT
We can observe a well-documented decline of trust levels in Western
societies: from the reputation of political representatives as being
‘not trustworthy’ to the rise of anti-system-oriented populist parties.
Yet the implications of diﬀerent forms of distrust for a society and
democratic institutions have been theorized in conﬂicting ways so
far. In order to illuminate existing inconsistencies in social and demo-
cratic theory, this article addresses two research questions: What are
the implications of diﬀerent manifestations of distrust for the accep-
tance of democracy and democratic institutions? How do diﬀerent
forms of distrust aﬀect the motivation to become engaged in demo-
cratic decision-making and in civil society institutions? Taking empiri-
cal evidence from 25 focus groups in Germany, our ﬁndings show
that growing social divisions aﬀect the role distrust plays for political








We constantly discover signals of thriving and rising distrust between citizens, institu-
tions, and nations almost everywhere (Levi and Stoker 2000). The reputation of political
representatives as being ‘not trustworthy’, the rise of anti-system-oriented populist
parties, as well as the trend of decreasing voter-turnout conﬁrm a well-documented
decline of trust levels within Western societies well able to shake the foundations of
representative democracies (Behnke 2009; Parvin 2015). Yet while the consequences of
existing levels of distrust for the individual have been developed extensively (Sennett
1999; Luhmann 2009), the implications of mounting distrust for a society and its
political institutions are controversial as they have been theoretically conceptualized
in diﬀerent ways (Ullmann-Margalit 2004). Some scholars have placed a cautious and
vigilant attitude of not trusting those in power at the center of any democratic institu-
tions and as a fundamental democratic principle (Barber 1983). Others have objected
this and have focused on social trust in the fellow citizen as crucial to any trust toward
a representative and the delegation of power to him (Uslaner 2002). While in the
former case rising levels of distrust in other citizens, a political representative, or the
political institutions would not impose a burden on the functioning of a liberal
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representative democracy, in the latter it could frustrate legitimate democratic decision-
making. Yet the diﬀerent implications and potential outcomes of diﬀerent types of trust
or distrust for a society have hardly been distinguished (Nannestad 2008).
In addition, existing levels of distrust have been suggested to have contrasting eﬀects
on political participation, depending on social and individual preconditions (Gamson
1968; Braun and Hutter 2016). Whereas some scholars have underlined the mobilizing
character of distrust given certain resources such as political interest, political eﬃcacy,
or education (Gamson 1968), others have highlighted a distrust-induced withdrawal
and disenchantment (Schäfer 2015). As citizen participation has always been under-
stood as a key feature of any vital democracy (Hooghe, Hosch-Dayican, and van Deth
2014), analyzing the impact of distrust on the willingness to engage is an important
cornerstone to understand its implications for democracy.
In order to address existing inconsistencies in social and democratic theory, this
article seeks to explore circumstances under which distrust can be understood as
a positive attitude toward democracy as it contributes to a better control of political
power and under which circumstances it leads to a shrinking acceptance of representa-
tive institutions that in the end undermines democracy. The article focuses on two
research questions: it asks (a) for the implications of diﬀerent manifestations of distrust
for the acceptance of democracy and democratic institutions and it analyzes (b) possible
eﬀects of distrust on the motivation to become engaged in democratic decision-making
or in civil society institutions. By addressing these two research areas qualitatively, it
seeks to help disentangle existing contradictions in social and democratic theory and to
explore possible consequences of distrust that go beyond the mere absence of trust (van
de Walle and Six 2014).
The authors have been involved in several projects analyzing various (non-)mobili-
zations of distrust toward democratic decision-making in Germany: (a) the biographical
background and the democratic attitudes of those active within non-traditional forms
of participation such as civil protesting (Walter et al. 2013; Klecha, Marg, and Butzlaﬀ
2013; Butzlaﬀ 2016; Hoeft, Messinger-Zimmer, and Zilles 2017); (b) non-voters who
have ceased to trust any established political process (Blaeser et al. 2016); (c) citizens of
municipalities where participatory processes did take place but who chose to abstain
from participating (Hoeft 2017; Hanisch and Messinger-Zimmer 2017). Each
represents a very diﬀerent way in which citizens can engage or disengage with demo-
cratic processes. If the assumption that diﬀering forms and roots of trust and distrust
form the way in which citizens relate to democracy is correct, a comparison between
these groups should reveal diﬀering patterns of trust and distrust. Focus group inter-
views that have been conducted within the mentioned projects form the empirical
foundation of this article but have been regrouped and interpreted with the research
interest formulated above.
The structure of the article is as follows: In Section ‘Distrust: between a requirement
and a liability for democracy’, we access existing conceptualizations of political distrust
and their consequences for the attitudes toward representative democracy. In Section
‘Distrust: between mobilizing and discouraging participation’, we review previous
theorizations of distrust leading to political mobilization or to a withdrawn and passive
attitude. Section ‘Data and methods’ reviews the methods and data used. Section ‘The
distrusting’ addresses expressions of political distrust in contemporary Germany and
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speciﬁcally asks for diﬀerences in the attitude toward democracy and the willingness to
participate in democratic decision-making. Section ‘Undermining the preconditions of
democratic representation’ summarizes the factors that contribute to diﬀerent types of
distrust and explores their consequences on democratic attitudes and mobilization: The
article shows that while some social groups develop a politically highly activated and
self-conﬁdent distrust aiming at inﬂuencing democratic decision-making, others
develop a passive and reclusive type of distrust. It also shows that growing social
divisions lead to growing diﬀerences in the role distrust plays in political interest
representation of social groups and that distrust creates a serious liability for the
acceptance of liberal representative democracy.
Distrust: between a requirement and a liability for democracy
Distrust and trust are two conceptually diﬀerent constructs that need to be treated
diﬀerently. They have been developed as attitudes, actions, or processes that help the
individual to cope with situations of uncertain outcome or vulnerability by reducing
complexity in a world we cannot control (van de Walle and Six 2014). Trust includes,
therefore, a leap of faith and the expectation that a person (or an institution) will
reliably comply and promote one’s own interests. Distrust, in contrast, is not just the
lack of trust but ‘an attitude in itself’ (van de Walle and Six 2014, 162) based on the
negative expectation that a person (or an institution) seeks to harm one’s own interests
and does not accept one’s own key cultural values (Hardin 2002; Ullmann-Margalit
2004). Yet both include the same three bases of origin that, however, are processed
diﬀerently and lead to either trust or distrust: First, trust or distrust might arise as
a consequence of (positive or negative) experience, when people, politicians, or institu-
tions prove to be trustworthy or not (Levi and Stoker 2000). Second, norms and values
can promote trust or distrust toward more or less speciﬁc entities that are culturally
transferred into daily routines (Grande 2000; van de Walle and Six 2014). Third, well-
knit social associations and networks shape the way people reciprocally learn and
develop social capital and are entangled in reﬂexive structures or dependencies that
induce trust or distrust (Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000). Political distrust would thus be an
attitude entailing negative expectations with regard to the trustworthiness of politicians,
institutions, or the political system based on experiences made, one’s own norms, and
values or the personal networks.
Consequently, scholars have described trust and distrust as concepts that tell more
about the societal conditions people live in and the quality of social systems (Lenard
2015) than about personality structures of citizens or an individual property (Delhey
and Newton 2003; Putnam 2000). Others, however, have emphasized trust and distrust
as comparatively stable individual characteristics that reﬂect individual living conditions
that are learned in early childhood and can only be slowly altered by severely diverging
experiences later in life (see e.g. Erikson 1950).
The implications of distrust for democracy have been theoretically developed in
conﬂicting ways. While some scholars develop political distrust as a key component
of democratic checks and balances and therefore as a major pillar of liberal representa-
tive democracy (Lenard 2015; Hardin 2002), others have underlined the destructive
eﬀects of social and political distrust – or mistrust, as some term it – on the functioning
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of liberal representative democracy (Nye 1997). On the one hand, democracy might
indeed be understood as institutionalized mistrust that secures checks and balances on
those in power and prevents them from overstepping their competences and maximiz-
ing personal gains instead of public well-being (Ullmann-Margalit 2004). As John
Keane’s diagnosis of a monitory democracy puts it, we have entered a phase of
democracy where a mistrusting attitude toward those in power and a cautious control
of decision-makers in politics, corporations, and civil society organizations have
become a cornerstone of liberal representative democracy itself (Keane 2010; van de
Walle and Six 2014). Also, people showing low levels of trust are more likely to vote for
government change, opposition, or independent candidates in a proportional represen-
tation system. This way, distrust is an important ingredient of the democratic alterna-
tion of power (Levi and Stoker 2000). In contrast, many scholars have argued that high
levels of trust and low levels of distrust between citizens and their representatives
should contribute to the functioning of liberal democracy (Lenard 2008). People
perceiving their government and their representatives as trustworthy are more likely
and willing to abide by the law even if it contradicts their personal interest on the short
run (Levi and Stoker 2000).
With regard to the research interest of this article, it is important to diﬀerentiate the
speciﬁc character, foundation, and object of the distrust observed. As Gamson has
developed in his classical analysis of power and discontent (1968), political trust or
distrust can have various objects and can be connected to individual representatives,
institutions, the political philosophy of a regime, or even the political community as
a whole. When judging the implications for democracy, it makes a huge diﬀerence
whether distrust is directed toward a single politician or political party which might be
removed from power in the next election or whether the distrust is rooted in the belief
that the whole set of institutions, political elites, or the political philosophy of a regime
is corrupt and cannot be trusted. Knowing if prevailing distrust roots in personal
experiences, norms, or social networks helps to understand its consequences for the
attitudes toward democracy.
Several scholars have therefore proposed diﬀerent terminologies concerning these
matters: Lenard (2008) makes a diﬀerence between DIStrust, which is destructive to
democracy and emcompasses even cynical or suspicious attitudes toward representatives
or democracy as a whole, and MIStrust, which refers to a vigilant or cautious attitude
toward possible violations of individual or fellow citizens rights. Others distinguish
between a particularized trust (or distrust), which is directed at very speciﬁc social groups
or individuals based on personal experience or values, and a generalized trust (or distrust)
which extends to people or groups one does not know in person and based on a general
expectation regarding their actions (Dahl 1998; Uslaner 2002; Stolle 2002). This connects
to the diﬀerence between bridging and bonding social capital Putnam used to describe
varying forms of social relations within society: Bonding is restricted to homogeneous
groups of people, whereas bridging refers to relations between heterogeneous groups of
citizens (Putnam 2000; Lenard 2008). Since a democracy depends on establishing an
accepted consensus beyond bonds of kinship and close social groups, prevailing bonding
social capital is likely to undermine a representative system whereas prevailing bridging
social capital would – at least theoretically – strengthen it. What all these terminologies
have in common is that they try to diﬀerentiate forms of trust/distrust that emerge in
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smaller, supposedly homogeneous, personally known entities that divide the population
into ‘them’ versus ‘us’ from forms of trust/distrust in heterogeneous entities which do not
rely on personal relations (Bäck and Christensen 2016).
This article therefore asks (a) for the speciﬁc basis of distrust and (b) at which
groups, individuals or entities distrust is directed. If forms of distrust lead people to
perceive other citizens or institutions in general as harmful and hostile, this would
mean a serious liability for the eﬀective functioning of any representative democracy.
Distrust: between mobilizing and discouraging participation
As political participation has been conceptualized as the ‘core venue’ (Vráblíková 2017, 1)
through which citizens exert the rule of the people and as the ‘elixir of life for democracy’
(van Deth 2014, 350), understanding how distrust inﬂuences the willingness to partici-
pate can be a good approximation for its eﬀects on democracy (Zittel and Fuchs 2007). If
speciﬁc forms of distrust lead to declining levels or to changing patterns of participation,
this triggers consequences for the acceptance of democratic decision-making if smaller or
less heterogeneous groups of people are continuously involved. Yet there is a wide array
of conceptualizations that develop conﬂicting assumptions of possible relationships
between the distrust a citizen has in his/her fellow citizens or the democratic institutions
and his/her willingness to play an active role in society.
The social capital literature assumes that there is a mutually supportive, positive
relationship between a generalized social trust and (political) participation (Uslaner and
Brown 2005; Levi and Stoker 2000; Bäck and Christensen 2016). It presumes that people
with a generalized trust are more likely to be active in various participation scenarios.
Given the experience of participation, they are likely to establish even higher levels of
generalized trust. This connects to a large strand in the social science literature, starting
from de Tocqueville to Almond and Verba (1963) to Putnam (2000) or Norris (2002).
This strand suggests that through associations and formal participation citizens learn
and internalize the values and norms of democratic citizenship. Thus, higher levels of
generalized social trust play a key role as a trigger for as well as an outcome of
participation (Bäck and Christensen 2016; Paxton 2002; Norris 2002). Democracy, in
this reading, builds on and fosters its citizens’ democratic actions on the basis of trust.
Others have complemented this perspective by stating the other side of the medal: that
it is the distrusting who abstain from political or communal participation (Schäfer 2015;
Uslaner and Brown 2005).
In contrast, the research on contentious mobilization, social movements, and protest
groups within Western societies has categorized political participation as depending on
political disaﬀection and the stimulus of distrust (Levi and Stoker 2000). The inﬂuence of
distrust on the motivation to participate has been developed especially for unconven-
tional forms of participation or, as some have termed it, extra-representational participa-
tion (Braun and Hutter 2016). This way, distrust as a root of (political) action motivates
repertoires that challenge elites and the political system and have often been considered as
illegitimate by parts of the population. Nevertheless, empirical results show that the
motivations to engage in alternative forms of participation have changed since the
1960s and 1970s and that demonstrations, protest, and civil opposition are nowadays
considered as positive and beneﬁcial to a democratic culture. As an accepted way of
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expressing one’s political preferences, they are no longer restricted to citizens driven by
distrust (Braun and Hutter 2016; Norris, Walgrave, and van Aelst. 2005).
Thus, whereas the literature on social capital states that trust activates people to
participate, the research on social movements shows that distrust can equally be a key
activator. Uslaner and Brown (2005) and Bäck and Christensen (2016) pick up these
contradicting conceptualizations and suggest that diﬀerent forms of (non-)participation
are subject to very diﬀerent causal mechanisms regarding the assumed nexus between
trust and participation. Social approval by people we trust might be an incentive to
participate, even when voicing distrust against the political system is the main purpose
of that participation. Social disapproval, in turn, might discourage (Klandermans and
van Stekelenburg 2014; Bäck and Christensen 2016).
The conditionality of distrust mobilization has led to a variety of theorizations of
what is needed for a decision to actively take part in: from political interest, the feeling
of political eﬃcacy, dissatisfaction with political outcomes, low social inequality levels,
higher educational levels, time constraints, to ﬁnancial resources or social networks
(Gamson 1968; Levi and Stoker 2000; Nannestad 2008; Haß, Hielscher, and Klink
2014). As there is still a lack of empirical studies that address the link between distrust
and participation (Bäck and Christensen 2016), it is a key research interest of this article
to shed light on the contexts, conditions, or resources that make distrust a mobilizing or
de-mobilizing factor and on why citizens interviewed in the focus groups were able to
become active or not.
Data and methods
In three projects between 2012 and 2016, the authors analyzed diﬀerent groups in
Germany that voiced and signaled political distrust in diﬀerent ways: citizens organiz-
ing protest groups (Walter et al. 2013; Butzlaﬀ 2016), people in neighborhoods where
voter turnout had decreased sharply (Blaeser et al. 2016), and citizens of communities
where participatory processes did take place but that chose not to participate (Hoeft,
Messinger-Zimmer, and Zilles 2017). Amongst other data, all three projects were based
on 25 focus group interviews (total approx. 200 people) spread over Germany: urban as
well as rural areas, involving diﬀerent regions, generations, and protest cultures.
Participants were recruited during participant observations of activists meetings and
on the streets of the low voter-turnout neighborhoods and communities with participa-
tion processes. The group discussions were all structured in the same way: they
assembled between six and ten participants – that were not necessarily known to
each other in daily life but that did share the same values on the issue in question
(Krueger and Casey 2009). Focus groups with activists were smaller than with non-
voters and non-participants because they tend to be outspoken and self-conﬁdent
discussants. All focus groups followed a standardized guideline, which ensured
a comparability between projects and which included speciﬁc questions on the project
focus as well as parts where views on the trustworthiness of fellow citizens, civic
engagement, politicians, democratic representatives, and the administration were dis-
cussed. The task of the team of two moderators was then to ensure an independent and
open discussion among participants while still addressing the issues we wanted to focus
on. The goal was to intervene as little as possible (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2010).
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A merit of focus groups is just that: they carve out universally accepted views, com-
municative rules, and commonalities of the groups assembled (Puchta and Wolﬀ 2003).
It is these commonalities, views and rules that we look for and ask whether activists,
non-voters, and non-participants diﬀer in their perspectives on democracy and parti-
cipation. We present the results organized by the three groups. The transcripts of the 25
focus groups have then been coded and interpreted using qualitative content analysis
(Schreier 2014). Coding categories included personal background, values and resources,
experiences with civic and political engagement and activism, attitudes toward democ-
racy and perceptions of active and non-active fellow citizens.
The distrusting
The activists
The activists interviewed in 13 focus groups throughout 2012 have been organizing civic
protest and action groups in rural as well as in metropolitan areas of Germany, and
have been addressing a variety of issues: educational reforms, big infrastructure projects
such as the enlargement of airports and train stations, projects related to the politics of
energy transition such as power lines and wind mills (Butzlaﬀ 2016; Walter et al. 2013).
All of the participants voiced a signiﬁcant amount of distrust directed at the political
representatives of established formats of democratic decision-making. All emphasized
that their motivation to create or join a civic protest group can be traced back to
a feeling that the political system relying on the aggregation of interests in political
parties and elected representatives had become ineﬀective, led to supposedly wrong or
destructive results, or had even become corrupt. Several strands of critique to rationa-
lize their distrust could be identiﬁed: First, that the system of political parties had led to
severe ineﬀectiveness because of its tendencies to award loyalty and inner-party-logics
over issue knowledge and experience. Especially bigger political parties with a broader
social scope were perceived not being able to eﬀectively address any policy issue because
they were continuously absorbed by maintaining inner-organizational consensus.
…mechanisms within a party simply lead to a situation where a good idea coming from
the base will be diluted by the decision-making process […] at the end, the result will be
some tame rubbish about which one says, okay, three lines represent roughly what
I meant, but it’s all very diluted… (Focus group in Hannover/Germany, 15.03.2012)
Civic protest groups, in contrast, tend to have a comparatively narrow range of issues
they address. In doing so, they have often developed a narrowed perspective and despise
necessities for societal compromise. It has become their deﬁning test of shortcomings in
the system to assess if the political decision-making process arrives at the same con-
clusion they have drawn.
Second, they were often convinced that representatives within political parties and
the bureaucracy are not as well prepared and professionally trained to take well-thought
-out decisions. Whereas a protest group can concentrate on their core interest, politi-
cians cannot devote a similar amount of time to the same issue due to the fact that they
simultaneously have to cover a wide range of other issues, too. This further fueled their
CRITICAL POLICY STUDIES 7
perception of a representative liberal democracy permanently leading to second best
decisions and reﬂects the fact that within protest groups we ﬁnd a disproportionately
high share of highly skilled and experienced people with a solid income, good social
networks, and with a well-developed conviction of political eﬃcacy.
…the reason why I am active is that I have experienced that when I wasn’t engaged […]
nothing went ahead. I have a background in local politics and from this perspective, I try
to support citizens who would otherwise not dare nor have the skills to get in touch with
local politics. I am driven by supporting citizens and by making it possible for them to
approach decision-making institutions. (focus group Hannover/Germany, 15.03.2012)
In contrast to the disburdening function of trust brought forward by Luhmann and
Sennet, the activists in the focus groups believed not trusting made things easier and
themselves less prone to frustration. They considered it a sign of political and social
maturity not to trust too much outside their social and political vicinity.
Third, in the focus groups, activists often enough showed an understanding of
democracy that focused on the capability to ensure an eﬀective output by gathering
knowledgeable and informed input and excluding non-informed or unjustiﬁed
demands. This made themselves and their own eﬀorts for participation valuable for
democracy in a normative way but also established a hierarchy of the value of partici-
pation between diﬀerent individuals or groups. The input of less informed or involved
parts of the population was viewed less important or even destructive, whereas their
own informed and experienced participation on particular issues was considered
fundamental. When looking at their perceptions of society and their trust toward
other people, it was remarkable that they perceived membership in their civil protest
groups as a trust-inducing asset. Given that civil protest groups gather people that share
a concern which often enough has become a crucial motivation in their lives – the issue
they keep voicing – and that they see as point of departure for their understanding of
democracy, they made a distinction between people that have had the same insight into
wrong and right and have drawn the same conclusions and people who have not (yet)
done so. Not taking action or participating in their struggle was often taken as proof for
not being aware, knowledgeable, able, or willing and therefore they questioned if the
non-active can be trusted in their democratic decision-making capabilities.
After all I don’t believe it [direct democracy, note by the authors] is indeed the only true
way. […] we have all seen what happens if everybody can join and take part in decision-
making […], those who are not truly aﬀected and those […] who have no clue, who just
want the issue to disappear… (refers to a lost referendum on the Stuttgart central train
station, focus group in Stuttgart, 02.04.2012)
The similarities to the conceptualization of particularized or bonding trust and distrust
are obvious as trust within the activists in the focus groups was developed with the strict
limitations that someone agrees with the in-group criteria and could therefore be
considered as trustworthy (Uslaner and Brown 2005; Stolle 2002). This understanding
of trust was expanded to the understanding of democracy. The participation rights they
demanded originated in their professional experience and social position and conse-
quentially people who lack the same social position or experience were met with
distrust. It was a highly particularized trust which additionally reﬂected the well-
developed perception of self-eﬃcacy of a local elite as many of these conﬂicts were
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smaller, more local ones and the protest groups gathered people who considered
themselves as experienced and knowledgeable in the local context, in contrast to
politicians and representatives at a regional or national level.
They were seeking to inﬂuence political decisions because they perceived themselves
as having the speciﬁc knowledge, experience, and self-conﬁdence to do so and they
expected democracy to achieve better-quality decisions if they personally had greater
access to the deﬁnitions and decisions of the desirable. It was an individualization of the
deﬁnition of the common good based on elitist social positions and voicing distrust
toward representatives and processes that could possibly stand in the way.
The non-voters
In contrast, the focus groups with non-voters were exactly the sociological opposite.
This is in line with what we know about the character and sociology of voting
abstention in Germany and elsewhere in the Western democracies (Schäfer 2015). In
2015/2016, six focus groups were conducted in neighborhoods that represented the
sociological proﬁle of urban areas where voter turnout had been shrinking sharply since
the beginning of the 1980s: neighborhoods with comparatively low income and educa-
tional levels, with high unemployment, higher share of people with migrant roots and
lower social status (Blaeser et al. 2016).
Democracy – from their point of view – had done little to help in their personal situation
and had in contrast led to stigmatization within society and their hometowns. As with the
activists, the non-voters underlined how little trust they had in the willingness of the
representatives of democracy to change their life for the better – and that they perceived
the design of contemporary liberal representative democracy as being responsible for this
ﬂaw. Democracy, as voiced in the focus groups, came into their lives only if they were to be
exploited as voters in elections without politicians showing interest in their daily life
struggles. A widely used illustration was the cynical caricature of party representatives
distributing giveaways as the classic German Bratwurst, this way making contact with the
electorate only during electoral campaigns. In the view of many in the focus groups,
politicians were elitist, self-serving, and irresponsible. Here, they hardly diﬀered from the
activists in the previous section.
Those politicians: everyone is just concerned with lining his pocket.
It just always stays the same and doesn’t get better. So why? (both Leineberg 24.07.2015)
We found a prevalent distrust in the intentions of politicians not only due to distrust in
their personality but also in the party structures and system imperatives that create
problematic short-term incentives focusing uniquely on the next electoral approval
without caring if campaign promises were kept. As a result, institutions, democracy,
and politics did not seem to make any diﬀerence – so why be active or vote?
Contrary to the rest of the society by whom they felt disrespected, they did show
trust in the behavior of people from they own neighborhood. They shared struggles of
daily life as well as the feeling of being excluded on the grounds of their local
neighborhood, and this led to a strong sense of communality. They experienced their
neighborhood as a societal dead-end limiting their individual life perspectives but at the
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same time felt unjustiﬁably stigmatized and proud of their community. We therefore
found a high prevalence of particularized trust in people from the same neighborhood
but a serious distrust toward others based on past experiences. This is, however, to be
interpreted cautiously because in the focus group discussions it became clear that there
was much distrust and fear within the neighborhoods, too (drugs, violence, of being
afraid to go out at night, etc.).
…when I go out at night I feel safe. Because I know everybody in the neighborhood. If
something happens, somebody will be around immediately. […] One day a little child
disappeared and the mother was crying out loud: ‘My kid is gone!’ And the whole
neighborhood came out and searched for that child. That’s how they found it. This
solidarity here is special. […] You can count on the guys. (focus group in Grone,
11.11.2015)
However, what diﬀered remarkably from the activists of protest groups is the fact that
non-voters did not believe that their personal voice could change anything – not at the
local and even less at higher political levels. They had much less knowledge about how
and where to be active and eﬀectively formulate demands within (local) democracy.
Non-voters in the focus groups often hardly knew the local representatives or party
leaders. They showed a very low sense of self-eﬃcacy and political self-conﬁdence and
often did not feel knowledgeable to judge upon political alternatives. At the same time,
they had a deep feeling of being exposed to changes in society but of not being in
control or able to cope with them. This low sense of self-eﬃcacy had signiﬁcant
demobilizing eﬀects and led to a perception of political engagement as suspicious and
mostly opportunistic and selﬁsh. Not least because in the non-voter’s perception,
political participation and voting was something that was imposed on them speciﬁcally
by those societal elites who made them feel stigmatized and that beneﬁtted from
economic and political decisions to a much higher degree.
Many people feel they are objects to decisions made elsewhere, you know? It doesn’t
matter what they vote. […] this is so frustrating, that you say I want to be left alone. It
doesn’t matter who I vote for, they basically do what they want. (focus group Grone,
09.11.2015)
In this view, participation in representative democracy through voting and political
engagement is a behavior elevated to a socially desirable norm that in the end beneﬁts
other groups within society. But at the same time, they showed a strong willingness to
engage in ﬂexible, small-scale focused, local associations of decisively non-political
character. We could therefore see a polarized perception of being active. Participation
is trusted only if it is within and for the local community. They did ﬁnd civic
engagement – such as in local sport clubs, children play groups, etc. – very important,
they just had the impression that there are far too few opportunities for engagement
within their neighborhood and they did not feel self-conﬁdent enough to organize by
themselves and even less to seek inﬂuence on local politics outside their neighborhood.
Furthermore, there were hardly any contact persons left in these neighborhoods
which could establish a reliable transmission channel into politics and who could
possibly make a potential inﬂuence of voting or participation credible. But people did
remember that there had been these contact persons in the past: members of local
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political parties or representatives of the city council which had been living in their
neighborhood. This added to the feeling of being left alone.
In their perception, democracy and democratic engagement – and voting seems to be
a part of that – had been taken over by the strong and wealthy. In addition, through
participation, those groups had increased their knowledge to inﬂuence political deci-
sions in their favor. Whereas the political distrust and the highly particularized trust in
those perceived close is a similarity between the activists and the non-voters, these
patterns root in very diﬀerent positions and experiences within society. Both diﬀer
considerably in their feelings of political self-eﬃcacy. In fact, the conﬁdence in their
ability to inﬂuence political decisions to their favor could hardly be more diverging.
And while the former drew the conclusion that they had to take over representative
democracy, the latter have pulled out.
The non-participating
The empirical foundation of the non-participating group in this article are six focus
groups in 2015/2016 with people who lived in communities where participatory delib-
erations with regard to power lines, wind mills, and fracking were organized but who
remained inactive and did not engage (Hoeft, Messinger-Zimmer, and Zilles 2017). The
decision not to participate had very diﬀerent individual reasons and heterogeneous
roots: On the one hand, people chose not to participate because they did not trust in
their personal judging and realization capabilities or did not trust the participation
mechanisms oﬀered. On the other hand, people satisﬁed with democratic procedures
and representative structures chose not to be active and participate just because they
trusted in the systems’ ability to manage problems in a productive and eﬃcient way
(Hanisch and Messinger-Zimmer 2017). Thus, not all non-participation is due to
distrust in politics or democracy. It is a much more heterogeneous and diverse group
of interviewees compared to the two groups of activists and non-voters focused above.
Whether people showed a trusting attitude toward politicians and representative
democracy or whether they were distrustful, suspicious, and dissatisﬁed with participa-
tion opportunities depended on their attitudes toward the issue at stake, toward civil
society engagement and the political system in general and – above all – the individual
resources to become engaged. Interestingly, discussants that did not show a strict
interest in the issue at stake or who even considered the oﬃcially proposed policy
solution eﬀective tended to trust much more in the established decision-making
mechanisms.
Especially the perceived costs to gather the needed information to judge upon the
issue and possible alternatives proved important: participatory processes seemed to
discourage many of the focus group discussants. Participation in decision-making
imposes a pressure on the individual to gather and process the necessary information
and to come to a conclusion. Many explained they needed further information on the
subject to be able to make a decision and demanded this information from politics and
bureaucracy. Yet many participants of the focus groups hardly trusted any additional
information provided through oﬃcial political channels such as the administration,
political parties, or representatives. Especially, experts backing the positions of political
parties and business companies – in the case of the discussed power lines etc. – were
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often confronted with severe distrust and were considered as strongly biased and
corrupt. More information does not necessarily lead to trust in the decisions taken if
people lack the complexity reduction resources necessary to process the information or
trust in the sources providing. In these situations, more information just leads to an
overload discouraging engagement.
Even if it is experts telling me […], I want to see scientiﬁc studies. But then, studies can be
faked. I do not trust anybody. It is about the money […] everything else is uninteresting.
We do not matter. They have already decided… (Focus group in Homberg, 25.03.2015)
What stood out was that the more an actor was considered to be inﬂuential in the
political or economic sphere, the less he was trusted. The belief that inﬂuence corrupts
was clearly visible. This connects to the observation that the locally present citizens’
initiatives (which did exist in all cases but which the participants had not joined) were
understood to gather authentic people with trustful motives that represent positions
and opinions in a democratic way and much closer to the interests of the majority of
the citizens. At the same time, they were considered trustworthy exactly because they
were believed to be powerless. This ﬁts nicely with the concept of trust proxies
Mackenzie and Warren (2012) have introduced to conceptualize trust-inducing eﬀects
of mini-publics. These can serve as trusted information proxies if they match criteria of
representativeness, include screens against conﬂict of interest, notions of deliberative-
ness, and agreement on the issue. This way, mini-publics can help citizens to manage
complex decision-making because they provide informed deliberation in
a representative and interest-protected framework that expresses the assumed consen-
sus of the public (Mackenzie and Warren 2012). That these assumptions partly apply to
citizen initiatives as well is shown by the fact that from the perspective of the distrusting
of the non-participating, the motivations and interests of citizens active in initiatives
can be trusted far more than the motives of politicians because of their perceived
representativeness and their opposition to vested interests. In a way, these citizen
initiatives were perceived as representative mini-publics organizing civic deliberation
and voicing public opinion on an issue – and were therefore trusted and led to less
individual motivation to become engaged.
Because they [the activists of protest groups, note by the authors] act on their own
interests. They want the best for themselves, kids, family, however, not like the politicians
or corporations who seek to put the money into their own pockets and make proﬁt. They
ﬁght for themselves. (Focus group in Homberg, 25.03.2015)
…but I think on the other hand they [the activists of protest groups, note by the authors]
are active, they look after things, that is right. This way, they even represent us who are
doing nothing… (Focus group in Altentreptow, 02.07.2015)
In turn, distrust in politicians and established structures of representation seemed to
root in a particularized trust, which was restricted to people from the local neighbor-
hood. Any professionalized structure of representation was conceived as corrupting and
met with suspicion. Furthermore, many were convinced that beyond any formal
decision-making process (which they often hardly knew and which to them remained
merely simulative), an informal network existed that was dominated by higher political
or economic strata and which would easily outplay the results of any deliberative
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participatory process. So if citizens’ initiatives are considered as a trustworthy provider
of information, but basically non-inﬂuential – why become active?
At the same time, the discussants in the focus groups hardly demanded further
inﬂuence for citizens’ initiatives. They voiced concern that more and direct inﬂuence of
citizens without democratic control would easily become problematic and could cor-
rupt exactly the motives that made them trustworthy. For many it was the combination
of low perceived inﬂuence and the local focus that made these initiatives credible and
trustworthy – and at the same time did not encourage engagement.
With regard to the implications of the character of distrust of the non-participating
for the acceptance of liberal representative democracy, it is important to repeat that not
all reservation from democratic participation is due to a fundamental distrust in its
actors and principles. There is in fact content and trusting non-participation.
Nevertheless, we found a signiﬁcant level of non-participation that was fueled by
a distrust in actors and structures of representative democracy and that came along
with a particularized trust on the grounds of geographical, sociological, and ideological
familiarity. Often enough, the reason not to engage in participatory mechanisms was
linked to (a) a missing belief that the political system was open to their personal input,
(b) a doubt they could individually live up to the requirements necessary to participate,
and (c) a missing belief that democratic or participatory decisions could be stronger
than informal networks of economic and political elites.
What maybe matters most in this sense is that we found considerable distrust in the
possibility of political representation mechanisms leading to policy solutions that
beneﬁt the majority of the people. Perceptions of society voiced in all focus groups
showed a clear suspicion that people would unjustiﬁably take advantage of the possi-
bility of political inﬂuence given to them and that representation without connectivity
to local communities was considered highly problematic and leading to worse decisions.
Undermining the preconditions of democratic representation
In this article, we addressed the consequences of current phenomena of distrust in
Germany for the attitudes toward representative democracy and for the motivation to
engage actively. The activists, the non-voters and the non-participants, all expressed
comparatively high levels of particularized and within-group trust and at the same time
clear signs of political distrust as a negative and at times cynical attitude toward the
reality of democratic representation. Yet this did not include democracy as a general
principle as virtually all participants of the focus groups considered themselves as true
democrats. Coming back to Gamsons’ four objects of distrust, we found distrust in all:
representatives, institutions, public philosophy, and the political community but less so
with regard to a democratic ideal. Many perceived themselves as the defenders of
a democratic idea by not trusting representative democracy.
However, when people tend to trust only the close and known and regard anyone
beyond the social and ideological vicinity with distrust and suspicion, this will have far-
reaching implications for any representative democracy as it renders compromise-
oriented negotiation of interests all the more complicated (Lenard 2008; Uslaner and
Brown 2005; Paxton 2002; Stolle 2002). The activists perceived themselves as saving
democracy from destructive developments from its inside and clearly limited their trust
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to people with the same convictions. This trust in people supposedly better capable of
decision-making is the core of their understanding of a true, eﬃcient, and better
democracy.
While activists demanded an individualized deﬁnition of the common good, the
non-voters felt they have no access to its discussion and that it made no sense to claim
it. They expressed serious doubts about the democratic reality, too, but in turn
considered themselves as (a) excluded and (b) lacking the capabilities to demand
participation. In comparison with the activists, they lacked political knowledge, self-
conﬁdence, and self-eﬃcacy, and had experienced continuous indiﬀerence from poli-
tical representatives. However, they had built up a certain local pride within their
neighborhoods rooting in the collective overcoming of adversarial living conditions.
The non-participating for their part showed a signiﬁcant distrust in representative
democracy, too, while maintaining a particularized trust toward those they feel akin
to. The amount of trust they showed in civil society actors was striking compared to the
level of distrust expressed toward political institutions, the administration, or corpora-
tions (Hanisch and Messinger-Zimmer 2017).
All groups perceived a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between professional politicians and
citizens regarding their trustworthiness and credibility. However, in contrast to the
activists, who considered inﬂuential citizens (as against inﬂuential political representa-
tives) trustworthy if they joined their struggle, the non-participants and the non-voters
remained very cautious and highly skeptical with regard to political inﬂuence, which
they generally considered corrupting. Those are hints for growing social divisions
altering the role distrust plays (a) for a democratic interest representation of social
groups and (b) for the acceptance of liberal representative democracy. Uslaner (2002)
and Nannestad (2008) have emphasized the importance of income equality for the
feeling of even-handedness and institutional fairness (Levi and Stoker 2000) which in
turn should foster generalized trust in a society. For Germany, the widespread percep-
tion of growing inequalities has been well documented (Westle 2015) which not only
aﬀected the non-voters’ feelings of being socially stigmatized but as well fueled the
activists’ fear of intensifying social conﬂicts for fewer resources. The fear of others
taking over democracies’ decision-making mechanisms to their advantage has been
clearly visible throughout the focus groups. The established mechanisms of representa-
tion and societal interest negotiation were losing acceptance because for the three
groups analyzed here they seemed to yield only weak results compared to the advan-
tages political representatives, the economic realm, or simply other social groups might
be able to realize. The fact that activists, non-voters, and – to a certain extent – the non-
participants all blame the political institutions and their representatives for much of
what is going wrong shows that the perception of institutional arrangements plays
a crucial role in shrinking societal trust levels. However, it is questionable if they were
to play a central role in any eﬀort to roll back its erosion as social preconditions of
prevailing distrust might undermine the acceptance to establish a social consensus.
Furthermore, in contrast to large strands of the theory, the people in the focus groups
believe not trusting makes things easier and them less prone to frustration. Whereas the
complexity reducing functions of trust have been well developed, in contrast, ﬂexible
capitalist consumer democracies seem to make distrust a complexity-reducing attitude
needed to confront the confusing reality of modern life. The recent electoral successes
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of right-wing populist parties thrive on exactly this limitation of trustworthy people to
the supposedly close and known of a homogeneous national people.
When looking at the relationship between distrust and participation, we found
considerable diﬀerences rooting already in the case selection: activists engage motivated
by their distrust whereas non-voters stayed away because they did not trust in voting as
a vehicle of a change for the better. Non-participants in turn did not show such a clear-
cut picture, but a considerable number of people interviewed expressed distrust in
political decision-making as a motivation not to engage in participation opportunities.
The perception of system openness and the respective individual resources to meet the
requirements of eﬀective participation seem to be the heart of these diﬀerences, as the
activists expressed much higher levels of political self-conﬁdence, self-eﬃcacy, and
political knowledge which they could even increase through their engagement (see
also Anderson and Tverdova 2001). Non-voters and non-participants in turn are
much less convinced that they could make themselves heard through democratic
participation or that their personal interests could be subject to democratic deliberation.
Striking was that none of the interviewed groups expressed trust in the political system
to balance existing social diﬀerences in participatory self-eﬃcacy. It therefore came
down to the individual or collective resources to make use of existing opportunities or to
force the political system to listen. If these were at hand, people became active and
engaged. If not, as in the case of the non-voters or the non-participants – for example,
when they felt unable to trust existing information – people remained inactive or
abstained from oﬀered participation channels. This conﬁrms assumptions that trust
roots become increasingly individualized as trust levels shrink within a society (Delhey
and Newton 2003).
In this sense, the activists engaged in protest groups underlined that the socializa-
tion eﬀects proposed by the neo-Tocquevillian literature do not live up to their
theoretical claim (van der Meer and van Ingen 2009): The civic organizations of the
activists did not turn into the often mentioned schools of democracy but instead into
pressure groups for the individualisation of the common good. If levels of trust within
a society have dropped all too low, it seems, associations and civil society can hardly
integrate people into a collective and consensus-oriented discourse. The foundations
of civil society associations playing a role as an educational framework for the
reproduction of democratic norms and values may depend on preconditions they
themselves cannot establish.
We therefore found existing distrust not to support a cautious attitude to control
democratic representatives and to set boundaries to a potential abuse of power, as
Lenard (2008) and others have argued, but instead to weaken preconditions of demo-
cratic representation and compromise-negotiation when it leads to an understanding of
democracy based on individualized lobbying and/or cynicism. Distrust individualizes
the probability to become engaged in civil society or political initiatives, and it changes
the role these associations can play for the reproduction of the democratic citizen. Thus,
whereas it has been convincingly developed that not trusting too much might be helpful
to avoid abuse in any democratic society, prevailing distrust clearly has strong negative
eﬀects for the acceptance of democratic representation and it deepens existing social
bias in the willingness to participate.
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